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The problem of constraining methodological pluralism is highlighted in a discussion of John Dupré's The Disorder of Things. Dupré requires limits on what are to count as legitimate scientific methodologies. Although Dupré recognises this requirement, he fails in his attempt to appropriately ground such limitations. © 1997 Inter-University Foundation.

Original publication

DOI

10.1080/02698599708573559

Type

Journal article

Journal

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science

Publication Date

01/12/1997

Volume

11

Pages

143 - 146