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In this work I present a detailed critique of the dignity-related arguments that have been advanced against the creation of human-nonhuman chimeras that could possess human-like mental capacities. My main claim is that the arguments so far advanced are incapable of grounding a principled objection against the creation of such creatures. I conclude that these arguments have one, or more, of the following problems: (a) they confuse the ethical assessment of the creation of chimeras with the ethical assessment of how such creatures would be treated in specific contexts (e.g. in the laboratory), (b) they misrepresent how a being could be treated solely as means towards others' ends,

Original publication




Journal article


Med Health Care Philos

Publication Date





487 - 499


Chimeras, Dignity, Human dignity, Human–nonhuman chimeras, Nonhuman animals, Part-human, Animals, Biotechnology, Chimera, Dehumanization, Ethics, Research, Gametogenesis, Genetic Engineering, Genetic Research, Human Rights, Humans, Stem Cell Research