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Stephen Mumford concludes a recent paper in Religions Studies, in which he advances a new causation-based analysis of miracles, by stating that the onus is 'on rival accounts of miracles to produce something that matches it'.1I take up Mumford's challenge, defending an intention-based definition of miracles, which I developed earlier, that he criticizes. I argue that this definition of miracles is more consistent with ordinary intuitions about miracles than Mumford's causation-based alternative. I further argue that Mumford has failed to demonstrate any advantages that his approach to miracles has over an intention-based approach. © 2003 Cambridge University Press.

Original publication

DOI

10.1017/S0034412503006590

Type

Journal article

Journal

Religious Studies

Publication Date

01/12/2003

Volume

39

Pages

459 - 463